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Within this paper we specify a symmetric two country model for the euro area to evaluate 
monetary and fiscal policy interaction with  decentralized fiscal authorities.  Obviously this 
calls for rules which neatly balance the chances and perils. Thereby we show that stringent 
rules are a prequisitive for a harmonious functioning of a monetary union. Nevertheless given 
the ability of fiscal policy to effectively stabilize the economic cycle we show that the current 
rules in reign are of little use. We close the paper by making some suggestions along which 
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1  Introduction 
 
With the launch of the third stage EMU the member countries have embarqued to unknown 
territory to tighten the political vision of a common European future. Once more the economic 
momentum served as a vehicle to link irreversibly the fat e of the member countries as it was 
from the outset of the union after WWII. As a consequence the twelve member states had to 
rethink and rebuild a new common European macroeconomic architecture that enshrined the 
views on monetary and fiscal policy interaction in the euro area. Unfortunately, the 
grandfathers of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) were not ignited by the challenge to 
restructure but mostly guided by cautioness, or put differently the new architecture- The 
Stability and Growth Pact- is a child of German “Angst”. Given the current problems and 
shortcomings of the SGP it is time to rethink and rebuild. 
The unique feature of a currency area is given by the fact that the different 
macroeconomic agents, the ECB, national governments and labour unions focus on different 
levels of target variables. The common central bank whose policy we assume to be conducted 
according to the notion of inflation targeting  (Svensson 1999) focuses on union wide 
aggregates. It sets nominal interest rates for the currency area consistent with its inflation 
target while equally having a concern for economic activity. This means in particular that the 
interest rate policy of the ECB will be indifferent against mean preserving distributions of 
macroeconomic outcomes across member states. In contrast governments basically focus on 
national aggregates. In a monetary union that is subject to asymmetric shocks fiscal policy 
serves as a firewall to block idiosyncratic shocks from spreading to other member countries. 
Of course fiscal policy might equally be itself the source of destabilisation as incentives for  
free-rider behaviour are present (Dixit and Lambertini 2001).  Therefore a monetary union 
calls for a renaissance of fiscal stabilization policy1. Obviously this calls for rules which 
neatly balance the chances and perils that are nested in monetary and fiscal policy interaction 
in a currency union with decentralised fiscal authorities. 
The paper is structured as follows: In a first step we aim to identify a small scale 
symmetric two country macromodel for the euro area that realistically describes the data. 
                                                   
1 In a closed large economy it is somewhat a consensus that active demand management should be conducted by 
the central bank as these have heavily improved over the last decades when it comes to stabilize economic 
fluctuations. John B. Taylor (2000) comes to the following conclusion: "In the current context of the U.S 
economy, it seems best to let fiscal policy have its main countercyclical impact through the automatic stabilizers. 
U.S. monetary policy has been doing a good job in the recent decades at keeping aggregate demand close to its 
potential GDP, partly because this is consistent with the Fed's inflation objective and partly because it is viewed 
as a good policy in its own light. " 
   2 
Thereby we specify an open economy Quarterly New Keynesian Macromodel that is 
augmented by fiscal policy. Analytically we calibrate the model along the lines as proposed 
by (Mayer 2003). To specify a model we need to identify the monetary and fiscal policy rules 
that describe the current macroeconomic paradigm in reign in Europe. Thereby we stress the 
view taken by the European Commission on fiscal policy rules and the view taken by the 
ECB- given its high status of legal independence- on monetary policy rules. 
Once we have calibrated the model we perform a battery of tests. In particular we want 
to evaluate the impact of symmetric and asymmetric fiscal spending shocks to underline the 
need for rules as fiscal policy instrumentalised by myopic politicians inflicts substantial 
damage on the rest of the union. This holds in particular as the ECB will only take care on 
idiosyncratic events insofar as they have an impact on the overall European averages. In a 
second step we analyse how effective fiscal policy is in  stabilising economic cycles by 
computing the impact of varying degrees of automatic stabilizers on the correlation structure 
of the model. In particular we will evaluate whether fiscal policy can  reduce the persistence 
nested in the output gap and the inflation rate. On the other hand we would like to state our 
mistrust that the rules as laid down in the SGP. The implicit assumption of the SGP that “high 
deficits lead to high inflation rates” has generated a malfunctioning alarming system. The 3% 
deficit criterion impairs the ability of fiscal policy to effectively stabilize the cycle. We finish 
the paper by giving some proposals along which we think the SGP should be reformed. 
 
 
2  Specifying a Symmetric Two Country Model for 
  the Euro Area  
 
In this section we will shortly highlight the current macroeconomic interaction in the euro -
area as enshrined in the reaty of Maastricht and the SGP in order to identify a realistic model 
for the euro area. As we will see the current macroeconomic paradigm in reign in Europe was 
highly shaped by the view that one needs stringent fiscal policy rules to safeguard the de-facto 
independence of the ECB2. The European Council feared that an unsustainable fiscal policy at 
the national level defined as one that breaks well defined rules causes negative spill over 
effects in the form of higher inflation rates and real interest rates for the rest of the union, and 
                                                   
2 The European Council stated: “The European Council underlines the importance of safeguarding sound 
government finances as a means to strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong sustainable 
growth conducive to employment creation. It is also necessary to ensure that national budgetary policies support 
stability oriented monetary policies. “(European Council 2003)   3 
in the worst case scenario ultimately calls for a bail out as a consequence of unsustainable 
debt/GDP ratios. In conclusion one can say that the current SGP was strongly shaped by the 
view that wet nosed governments could ultimately inflate Europe. In the following section we 
put the focus on identifying monetary and fiscal policy rules that were designed to prevent 
such developments. 
 
2.1  The Current Setting of the ECB  
Despite its official strategy (see (ECB 2004)) it is common practice to specify the objective 
function of the ECB by the following loss function, although it is typically related to a regime 
of inflation targeting. 
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According to equation (1) the ECB tries to reduce aggregate price dispersion across 
the currency area while equally having a concern for  stabilising economic  activity. The 
preference parameter  l  depicts the weight monetary policy attaches to  stabilise the output 
gap versus stabilising the inflation rate. Additionally Woodford has shown that equation (1) 
can be derived as a quadratic approximation to a households expected utility problem in a 
New Keynesian Macro Model  (Woodford 2003). In order to achieve its targets the ECB sets 
the interest rate in response to exogenous disturbances and consistent with the structural 
equations of the model so that the loss function LECB,t is minimised. Note that the ECB only 
targets at area wide averages, whereas it does not take care on the dispersion of goal variables 
across member states. In other words the ECB does not cons ider the spread as a problem as 
long as it is mean preserving. Additionally we assume that the ECB implements its desired 
target rate only gradually. Interest rate smoothing can be rationalized by a broad range of 
arguments. Among them are for instance that the ECB does not want to disrupt financial 
markets. Additionally gradualism can be a direct result of uncertainties to which a monetary 
policy maker is exposed (Brainard uncertainty, model uncertainty, data uncertainty ((Martin 
and Salmon Chris 1999))). From a theoretic p erspective interest rate smoothing is a device of 
making use of private sector expectations of further interest rate steps in the same direction in 
a forward looking environment ((Lansing and Bharat 2001)). 
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2.2  The Current Setting of Fiscal Policy 
The institutional design of the European monetary union was heavily shaped by the „Delors 
Report“ that called for stringent rules for national fiscal policies as a prequisitive for an 
efficient functioning of monetary policy (Bofinger 2003). In particular the German side was 
anxious that individual member states could conduct an unsustainable fiscal policy that would 
trigger a chain reaction of higher average inflation and nominal interest rates for the rest of 
the union. Therefore the grandfathers of the SGP intended to design fiscal rules for national 
policymakers that prevented fiscal authorities itself from being a major source of economic 
disturbance. This was laid down in particular by the following two interrelated rules which are 
intended to serve as a firewall against myopic fiscal policymakers: 
•  The ratio of the current nominal balance to GDP should not exceed the 3%-line unless the 
economy is hit by a large shock. 
•  The debt /GDP  ratio should be in the medium run close to or below 60%. 
According to the Commission the CAB should be balanced over the cycle. 
Nevertheless this does of course not rule out that the CAB is used in a discretionary manner. 
As automatic  stabilisers and discretionary fiscal policy are freely allowed to operate the 
definition of a sustainable fiscal policy combines at least from the perspective of the 
Commission long run sustainability with short run flexibility ((EEAG 2003). 
 
Figure 1: The actual budget balance as a function of the output gap 
yCAB0 yCABc yCAB-c -3% Maastricht deficit criterion
CAB=-c CAB= 0 CAB=c
Nominal balances
Output gap
yCAB0 yCABc yCAB-c -3% Maastricht deficit criterion




Based on EEAG (2003), p.54. 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
3 Note that throuuoght our exposition we will make use of the fact that after scaling the intertemporal loss 
function by  ( ) 1 d -  the intertemporal loss function approaches the weighted average of the unconditional 
variances of the individual goal variables:  ( ) [ ] [ ] [ ]
1 lim1 tttt LVarVaryVari
d dpln
￿￿ﬁ -=++D .   5 
If the CAB is zero on average automatic  stabilisers can freely operate and the 
likelihood that the 3%-deficit criterion will be broken is low  (see Figure 1). Only if the 
economy is hit by a large shock so that y<y CAB the monitoring procedure will be triggered. 
Nevertheless if the CAB is for instance on average –c% small shocks are likely to run fiscal 
policy into troubled waters as normal output fluctuations trigger the monitoring procedure
4. 
Obviously a fiscal policy stance that exhibits a negative nominal balance even if the output 
gap is zero increases the likelihood to break the 3%-deficit criterion in the vague of shocks. 
In order to incorporate fiscal policy into our small scale macromodel we  follow 
(Taylor 2000) who  has proposed for reasons of plausibility that US fiscal policy can be 
described by the following relationship: 
  1,1,11,
f
ttt gyg ce =-++  (2) 
With  11,t y c -  measuring the reaction of fiscal policy to the state of the cycle. The 
constant  1 g  depicts the structural fiscal balance over the sample period;  1,
f
t e  denotes a fiscal 
spending shock. For the sample period 1983-1999 Taylor has estimated  c  to be -0.37% and 
the constant was estimated to be 0.31. Hence Taylor makes the prediction that a decline in 
output by 1% induces an increase in government financial balances by 0.37 percent. In a 
similar approach Van Arle et al (2002) have proposed a parameter of  0.5 c =  for the euro 
area. To make realistic inferences in a quarterly model we follow (Ballabriga and Martinez-
Mongay C. 2002) and additionally introduce inertia in fiscal spending decisions: 
  1,11,1,11,
f
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Obviously this simple specification of fiscal policy does not disentangle whether the 
cyclical stance is automatic (automatic stabilizers) or intentional (discretionary policy). But as 
it is our aim to measure the overall impact of fiscal policy on the cycle this cannot come as a 
drawback. Throughout the paper we will not take debt smoothing as an independent goal of 
fiscal policy into account. (Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay C. 2002) have shown that the 
output gap is equally influenced by the level of debt. (Auerbach Alan J. 2002) comes to a 
similar finding for the USA as he reports that fiscal policy seems to respond systematically to 
both: cyclical factors and the fiscal balance during recent decades. 
 
 
                                                   
4  For an overview on the deficit proceedure see ECB (2003) Mo nthly Bulletin. Box 7, page 58.    6 
2.3  An open Economy New Keynesian Macro Model as a 
  Vehicle to Model EMU 
 
The vehicle we use to model the euro area is an open economy hybrid New Keynesian Macro 
Model. It consists of the following building blocs: 
•  An open economy hybrid Phillips curve that directly incorporates foreign inflation. 
•  An open economy hybrid IS-curve that is augmented by fiscal policy and the real 
  exchange rate as a measure of intra-European competitiveness. 
We will shortly discuss each bloc in term. 
 
2.3.1 An Augmented Hybrid New Keynesian IS-Curve: Euler 
Equation 
The first building bloc of a New Keynesian Macro Model is the IS-equation. It gives a 
description of the demand side of the economy. The New Keynesian IS-curve is a relationship 
that relates the output gap negatively to the expected real interest rate. At a quarterly 
frequency it can simply be stated as: 
  ( ) 1,1,1,1,1,11,11,31, 11 1
        
nm
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Hence it is assumed that today’s output gap evolves as a weighted average of 
yesterdays and tomorrows output gap as well as on the current and future stance of monetary 
policy. The charm of this approach stems from the fact that it can be derived from 
microeconomic foundations. Let us assume that the behaviour of a representative household 
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Households draw their total income from their labour income and their predetermined 
money and bond holdings which they carry over to the next period. They allocate their wealth 
                                                   
5  Withh: habit formation, s : Risk Aversion and (1/s)= intertemporal elasticity of substitution,  e: inverse of 
the elasticity of money holdings, g : steady-state -money holding, l : shock to he households preferences   7 
on money and bond holdings as alternative assets and their desired level of consumption. The 
households intertemporal optimisation problem is given by  maximising its utility subject to 
his budget constraint. The household chooses depending on  the model specification 
1(,), C(,), (,)  BhfhfMhf ttt + (see for instance  (Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba 2002)). The 
utility function implies (external) habit persistence. This means that the household is not only 
interested in the level of consumption  12 ,,,... ttt CCC ++, but also in the ratio of tomorrows 
consumption in relation to some (external) habit stock. This assumption automatically 
introduces inertia into the first order condition for consumption as not only tomorrow, but also 
yesterday matters. Maximizing the  intertemporal utility function with respect to the constraint 
implies that the following combined first order condition (for consumption and bond 
holdings) has to hold: 













  (7) 
The basic intuition for this equation is quite simple. It states that the marginal utility of 
consumption today and tomorrow should be equal in equilibrium. As we have complete 
contingent claim markets you have the possibility to carry your purchasing power in the form 
of bonds through time (Cochrane H. 2003). If you buy  1
t P  units of assets today they pay -off a 




+  tomorrow6.  
In order to capture the international linkages we augment the IS-equation by the 
following features: 
  ( ) tii q pp - D=-   (8) 
 
d
i exy V - =   (9) 
  1,11,1,11,
s
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Relationship (10) i s the change in the real exchange rate as a measure for intra-
European competitiveness. If foreign inflation rates are higher than domestic ones in 
disequilibrium domestic products become more attractive and hence the output gap will be 
                                                   
6 One important mechanism from the perspective of monetary policymakers is that higher expected real interest 
rates today imply that consumption should grow ( ) 1 1 tt CC + > . This assumption is from an empirical perspective 
somewhat problematic as recently mentioned. Hence the intertemporal Euler equation predicts that the 
substitution effect is dominant and people consume less today and more tomorrow if the interest rate is expected 
to grow. Literature that documents the problems when trying to take the Euler  equation to the data is for 
instance: (Matthew B.Canzoneri, Robert E.Cumby, and Behzad T.Diba 2002),  (Goodhart and Hofman Boris 
2003). Nevertheless we will use the Euler equation in its standard specification a s a workhorse to model the 
demand side of the economy.   8 
pushed above its potential until the new equilibrium is reached. With ex
d (see equation (9) ) 
we measure the excess demand that results if a foreign country  has a boom in output, so that 
exports and hence economic activity start to accelerate. Equation (10) is the fiscal policy rule. 
Combining these equations we arrive at the following open economy IS-relationship: 
 
( ) 1,1,1,1,1, 11
11,11,31,1,12,1,
1
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2.3.2   An Augmented Hybrid Phillips Curve 
The supply side of the economy is described by an augmented New Keynesian Phillips Curve. 
It gives a description of the supply side of the economy. In its focus, following (Calvo 1983) 
is a monopolistically competitive firm in the intermediate good sector that faces restrictions 
on its ability to set prices and wages in a flexible manner (see (Erceg, Henderson D., and 
Levin A.T. 2000)). In each period only a fraction of firms are called upon to act to set prices 
optimally. While resetting the price firms take in particular into account the probability of 
being stuck with the new reset price for j periods. Following (Amato and Laubach 2001) all 
other firms that were not called upon to reset their prices follow a rule of thumb and simply 
index prices by last periods inflation rate. Accordingly the law of motion can be stated as (see 
for instance (Smets Frank and Wouters Ralf 2003)): 
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,where 
j
t p %  denotes the optimal reset price. The parameter  pt l  denotes the time varying mark -
ups in the good markets that can be interpreted as cost push shocks.  
Given  its period profit function the monopolistically competitive firm  maximises 
expected profits using a discount factor which is consistent with the pricing kernel for 
nominal returns used by its shareholders (see equation 
Fehler! Ve rweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden.). Following  (Calvo 1983) only a 
fraction of firms receives each period the price change signal. The resulting first order 
condition is given by: 
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Box 1: Open Economy New Keynesian Macro Model for a Monetary Union: 
Central bank is guided by the following  period loss function: 
222 ˆˆ tttt Lyi pln =++D  
 
The area wide aggregates: 
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Augmented hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve: 
1,1,11,1,1,2,1, 11 (1)
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Augmented hybrid New Keynesian IS-curve: 
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where 
j
t p %  is the optimal price of those firms that are called upon to select their optimal 
reset price. Log-linearization of the dynamic law of motion (see equation  (12)) yields the 
following reduced form hybrid Phillips curve ((Uhlig 1999) (Smets Frank and Wouters Ralf 
2003)) 
  ,,1,,,,, 11 (1)
sn
itititkjitjyiitiitit ji Ey ppp pvpvbpbxpe -+--- == =+-+++ ￿￿
7  (14) 
In order to describe the inflation dynamics in a monetary union we  augment the hybrid 
Phillips curve by the inflation rate that prevails in the rest of the union  , it p - . The basic idea 
for this open economy version of a Phillips curve is as follows. When foreign inflation rates 
start to pick up then domestic inflation rates will equally accelerate, as parts of the products 
that consumers purchase come from abroad. Summarizing the previous paragraph we can 
state o ur small scale macromodel for the euro area as follows (see Box  1): 
 
 
4  Calibration of a Euro Area Model by Matching 
  Moments 
 
In the following section we use a calibration scheme that simultaneously calibrates the 
preference vector of monetary policy as well as the degree of forward-lookingness in the 
Phillips curve and the IS-relationship along the lines as proposed by  (Mayer 2003). For the 
remaining parameters we retrieve estimates along the lines as proposed by (Rudebusch 2000)  
and Van Arle at al (2003).  
 
4.1  Calibration Scheme 
Let us make (as untested apriority) the assumption that a New Keynesian Macro Model 
describes the true data generating process at a quarterly frequency. Taking this apriority we 
calibrate the model  by choosing  1 y p ylnmm Øø = ºß   in order to minimize the 
following distance criterion 
  ( )
' MinW
y
q   (15) 
                                                   
7 Of course from a theoretical point of view one should take the deviation of marginal costs from its steady state 
values. Nevertheless given a CES production technology their will be a linear relationship between deviations 
from marginal cost from its steady state value and the output gap. Therefore we opt to take the output gap as   11 
based on matching moments. Each criterion consists of the absolute squared 
percentage difference between the individual variances and autocorrelations of each variable 
(the inflation rate, the output gap, the interest rate and the respective differences) implied by 
1 y p ylnmm Øø = ºß  minus the corresponding empirically observed values in the 
historical data 1983:1-2002:4 (see Appendix A3). The backward looking inflation polynomial 
in the Phillips curve  i p a , the impact of economic activity on inflation  y a , the interest rate 
sensitivity of economic activity in the IS-curve  r b , and the autoregressive part in the output 
gap equation  yi b  was estimated along the lines as proposed by (Rudebusch 2000). We used 
the following specifications:  t p  was specified as the quarterly inflation rate in the GDP chain-
weighted price index  t p  seasonally adjusted and calculated at an annual rate  ( ) 1 4lnln tt PP - - ; 
t p  is the four quarter moving average constructed as  ( )
3
0 14 tj i p - = ￿ ;  t i  is the four quarter 
average interest rate, hence 
3 1
4 0 tj i i - = ￿ ; y t is the output gap constructed as the percentage 
deviation of the output Yt from trend output 
*
t Y , where 
*
t Y  was specified as the HP-filtered 
output gap with smoothing factor set equal to 1400. All variables were demeaned prior to 
estimation. Note in particular that the specification as proposed by (Rudebusch 2000) implies 
that the sum over the inflation polynomial (
4
1 1 i i p b
= = ￿ ) is equal to one, so that the long run 
neutrality of money holds. This means in steady state ( 123 ...
TTTT
ttt pppp --- ==== .) it holds 
that: 





=   (16) 
Obviously the property of long run neutrality is violated as long as 
[ ] 1234 1 pppp bbbbb +++=„ . Higher inflation targets 
T p  could boost output permanently, 
which would violate the long run neutrality of money8. Thus, it is desirable to set the slope 






= . This is from an economic point 
of view somewhat problematic as  b  should be interpreted as a discount factor of households. 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
measure of economic activity. The output gap was specified as an HP filter, hence we did not endeavour to 
measure the deviation of the output gap from its flex-price equilibrium. 
8 Note however that some might argue that changes in the equilibrium inflation rate induce new steady states, so 
that the argument is somewhat flawed.   12 
4.2  Evaluating the Identified Model 
In the following section we will evaluate the outcomes of the proposed calibration scheme. As 
indicated by  Table  1 the identified vector  [ ] 13.45.950.50.2 y =  captures the 
correct signs of the autocorrelation functions over all relevant variables.. 
 
Table 1 Time Series Properties: Simulated and Actual Data: (1970:1-2002:4) 
LEVELS    ONE-QUATER-CHANGES  RANK 
i y   STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
AC(1)  AC(2)  AC(3)   
STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
AC(1)  AC(2)  AC(3) 
  Inflation 
Data  1.37  0.862  0.811  0.823    1.54  -0.364  -0.304  0.076 
Fitted  1.319  0.6527  0.4813  0.3925    1.0994  -0.2533  -0.1189   
0 l =   0.881  0.2527  0.033  0.0812    1.0771  -0.353  -0.1793   
12 l =   0.8923  0.2784  0.0713  0.1163    1.072  -0.3565  -0.1747   
1 l =   0.9033  0.3008  0.1035  0.1457    1.0682  -0.3589  -0.1713   
2 l =   0.9238  0.3378  0.1552  0.193    1.0631  -0.3621  -0.1665   
                   
  Output Gap 
Data  0.86  0.836  0.677  0.527    0.47  0.027  -0.031  0.023 
Fitted  0.7496  0.7184        1.4924       
0 l =   0.5409  0.3082        1.0582       
12 l =   0.5328  0.3072        1.0577       
1 l =   0.5272  0.3071        1.0181       
2 l =   0.5199  0.307        1.0063       
                   
  Interest Rate 
Data  2.94  0.958  0.903  0.841    0.485  0.466  0.154  0.054 
Fitted  0.9673  0.453  0.151  0.019    0.4708  0.2741  -0.0998   
0 l =   0.4227  0.453  0.151  0.019    0.1561  0.4935  0.1571   
12 l =   0.4234  0.453  0.151  0.019    0.1542  0.4431  0.1407   
1 l =   0.4298  0.453  0.151  0.019    0.157  0.3906  0.1125   
2 l =   0.4498  0.453  0.151  0.019    0.1691  0.2947  0.0496   
                   
   13 
Additionally we have plotted as a control group four other vector combinations which are 
commonly used in literature as a cross cheque (see for instance (Coenen Günter 2003))
9. 
Table  1 indicates that the identified vector does a better job in capturing in particular the 
levels of all variables. This holds for both, the standard deviations as well as for the 
autocorrelations. Nevertheless within our impulse response analysis we will equally plot 
(l=0;  2 n = ) to show the dependence of our results on the identified combination  y . All 
other combinations generate impulse response functions that lie in between these two. 
In order to evaluate the uniqueness and determinacy of the rational expectations 





+ =-  
satisfies the p roposition of Blanchard et al.(1980) that states that the number of non-
predetermined variables should be equal to the number of unstable eigenvalues (see Figure 2) 
As can be seen the model is remarkably robust against changes in the preference vector of 
monetary policy. For a vast range of parameter constellations  [ ] [ ] 050 ln ˛  uniqueness 
and stability holds. On contrary the model seems to display indeterminacy for combinations 
of high degrees of  forward-lookingness in the Phillips curve and the IS-equation. This 
scenario occurs if we have low degrees of habit persistence in the IS-equation and a high 
share of Calvo price setters in the Phillips curve. Additionally indeterminacy  seems to be an 
issue for combinations of very active fiscal (high degree of automatic stabilization) paired 










                                                   
9 The forward-looking polynomials have been specified according to estimates as provided by (Smets Frank and 
Wouters Ralf 2003). They present an estimate of the consumption habit in the euro area which is equal to 
0.551 h = . This translates into  a coefficient of 0.64 for the degree of forward lookingness in the intertemporal 
IS-equation. For the share of Calvo price setters they estimate  p g =0.91 which translates into an estimate of the 
degree of forward lookingness in the Phillips curve which is equal to 0.52.   14 
Figure 2 Regions Of Determinacy 
(a) 
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The simulations were performed under the baseline calibration:  [ ] 13.45.950.50.2 y = . 
 
5  On The Need for Stringent Fiscal Policy Rules in 
  a Monetary  Union 
 
In the proceeding section we have identified a symmetric two country model for the euro area 
that generates a stable and unique rational expectations equilibrium. Based on this model we 
will now provide the basic rationale for stringent rules in a currency area. In order to 
understand how fiscal policy functions in a monetary union and why there is a need for 
stringent rules we evaluate the impulse response functions with respect to symmetric and 
asymmetric fiscal spending shocks.  
As can be seen from Figure 3 a symmetric fiscal spending shock induces persistent 
deviations of the inflation rate from the inflation target of the central bank. Due to the boost in 
fiscal spending economic activity starts to accelerate and output is above its potential. As 
monetary policy aims at stabilising i nflation as well as the output gap the central bank will   15 
increase short term interest rates which depresses economic activity. Quite naturally the 
impulse response pattern is similar to that one would observe in the case of a demand shock. 
In sum the impulse response function depict that fiscal spending shocks can induce persistent 
swings in all key variables. 
Quite obviously as known from VAR-analysis persistence is a very common theme 
and not specific to a monetary union. Potential conflicts are nested in asymmetric spending 
shocks as they potentially generate dispersion across currency areas. 
Therefore the need for rules prevails for the case of asymmetric fiscal spending 
shocks. Let us assume that fiscal authorities in country one trigger an unexpected fiscal 
expansion. The impulse response functions illustrate that a central bank that is indifferent 
against mean preserving spreads can hardly operate conveniently in such an environment. The 
key problem for the ECB prevails in the graphs (a)/(b)/(c)/(d). The persistent deviations in all 
target variables is remarkable. The spending shock in country one boosts its own inflation rate 
as well as the output gap. The ECB only reacts modestly compared to a symmetric spending 
shock as the short term nominal rate is only raised round about half of the size one could 
observe for a symmetric shock. The ECB faces the fundamental problem that economic 
activity in country one is fuelled by the domestic spending shock whereas country exhibits 
cyclical swings, as the ECB increases short term interest rates. Thus the ECB can not punish 
individual member states by rising average real interest rates which clearly shows that 
stringent rules are a necessary prequisitive for the well functioning of a monetary union, to 
prevent free rider behaviour and negative spill over effects for other member states. The 
depression in economic activity in country two is somewhat dampened as our model 
following  (Van Arle, Garretsen Harry, and Huart Florence 2003) allows for direct demand 
spill over effects. Additionally we can already see that automatic stabilizers in country two 
prevent swings in the output gap from becoming more persistent. Hence the impulse response 
functions show that automatic stabilisers serve as a useful instrument to cushion the 
consequences of an unsustainable policy in other member states.  
This simple illustration clearly indicates that there is an urgent to safeguard the ECB  
by stringent fiscal rules. In the case of asymmetric fiscal spending shocks fiscal authorities 
can be a source of destabilisation. The link between fiscal deficits and high inflation rates that 
were of great concern to the grandfathers of the SGP is clearly present.  
The two causal mechanisms in our model that govern the divergence in real conditions 
are the wedges in the real exchange rate and the wedge in the intra-european competitiveness. 
Ceteris paribus the real rate effects will be more pronounced in relatively closed economies   16 
whereas with an increasing degree of openness the real exchange rate effect is likely to 
decrease in importance.  
 
Figure 3: Symmetric Fiscal Spending Shock*: 
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*The dotted line plots the impulse response function  of the fitted combination. The squared line plotts the impulse response function 
attatched to ( l =0;  2 n = ). All other evaluated combinations lie in between.   17 
 
Figure 4 Asymmetric Fiscal Spending Shock 
(a) 
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*The dotted line plots the impulse response function of the fitted combination. The squared line plotts the impulse response function 
attatched to ( l =0;  2 n = ). All other evaluated combinations lie in between. 
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Figure 5 :Measuring some indicators for dispersion 
(a) 
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*The dotted line plots the impulse response function of the fitted combination. The squared line plotts the impulse response function 
attatched to ( l =0;  2 n = ). All other evaluated combinations lie in between. 
 
 
6  On the Deficiencies of the SGP 
 
In the previous section we have stressed the need for stringent policy rules that combine long 
run sustainability with short run flexibility. Unfortunately the current SGP is inappropriate to 
achieve this task. The main construction error of the SGP is its underlying assumption that 
countries w ith high deficits have high inflation rates. As shown in  (Bofinger 2003) by 
regression analysis this is generally not true for the euro area. This fundamental construction 
error implies that the SGP has at least two series deficiencies which we will discuss in term. 
In particular it potentially impairs the ability of fiscal policy to effectively stabilise the cycle. 
Additionally the 3% deficit criterion has created a malfunctioning alarm-system which needs 
to be reformed. 
   19 
6.1   The impact of automatic stabilizers on the correlation 
  structure 
 
In this section we analyse how powerful fiscal policy is. To get a deeper understanding 
we evaluate the mechanics of the model. In particular we will take a look at the sensitivity of 
the variances and autocorrelations with respect to changes in the stance of fiscal policy a s 
measured by  c  (see equation  (17)). Remember throughout our model we have assumed that 
fiscal policy is conducted according to the following rule : 
  1,11,1,11,
f
tttt ggyg cle - =-++   (17) 
In order to evaluate the power of fiscal policy we analyse the impact of fiscal policy on the 
standard deviation of the inflation rate, the output gap and the interest rate if fiscal policy 
engages more actively in dampening cycles (increasing  c ).  
Figure 6 shows that a symmetric increase in fiscal activity (increasing  c ) leads to a 
drop in the standard deviations of the aggregate inflation rate, the output gap and the interest 
rate itself in both countries. Not surprisingly the variance in the output gap drops as fiscal 
policy becomes more active, as it smoothes out the impact of demand shocks ( Figure 6). As 
positive side effect a more stable output gap translates into less persistent fluctuations of the 
inflation rate. Hence a more active fiscal policy does not only succeed in stabilising output but 
also serves as an instrument to bring the inflation rate closer to a white noise process. 
In order to compare the stabilisation properties of fiscal and monetary policy Figure 6 
depicts the  ability to reduce the persistence of the inflation rate and the output gap 
respectively. Quite remarkably fiscal policy  –guided by a simple rule- is very effective in 
stabilising the output gap as the persistence sharply drops in response to a more active  fiscal 
stance (increasing  c ). The ability to reduce inertia in output is comparatively better than the 
one of monetary policy. Hence if one abstracts from the effects of distorting taxes a passive 
fiscal policy can only hardly be rationalised from a stabilisation perspective given the sound 
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Figure 6 Standard Deviations 








































































*The dotted line plots the impulse response function of the fitted combination. The squared line plotts the impulse response function 
attatched to ( l =0;  2 n = ). All other evaluated combinations lie in between. 
 
The preceding two sections clearly present evidence that a currency area needs fiscal 
policy rules in order to prevent individual member states from free rider behaviour. On the 
other hand fiscal policy is potentially a powerful tool from a  stabilisation perspective. 
Therefore we conclude that a tying hands policy that would prevent fiscal policy from being 
used actively to fight cycles can hardly be rationalised. Such a trade-off constellation clearly 
calls for stringent rules that liberate the potential benefits while equally dawn the potential 
harms. This was of course exactly what the grandfathers of the SGP had in mind when trying 
to combine short run flexibility (operate within 3%-deficits) with long run sustainability 
(debt/GDP< 60%), but unfortunately as we will illustrate in the next section t he rules   21 
designed were flawed from the outset as they are based on the faulty assumption that high 
inflation rates mirror high deficits. 
 
6.2 Deficiency 1: The 3% Deficit Criterion Impairs the Ability of 
  Fiscal Policy to Stabilise Economic Activity! 
The c urrent SGP assumes that ‘sound budgetary positions’ are the dominant strategy to 
safeguard price stability.  Therefore the 3% deficit criterion limits the ability of short run 
flexibility as the SGP assumes that excessive deficits might cause inflation and unsustainable 
debt dynamics in the long run. Based on the following simulations: 
  1 ttt XMXv - =+   (18) 
{ }
'





titititititit neheehe --- =  
we either assume asymmetric supply or demand that hit country one. 
Table 2: Switch from an active fiscal stance  0.3 c =  to a passive  0 c =  on 
COUNTRY I 
RATIO (Y 0.3 c = /Y 0 c = ) 
SYMMETRIC SHOCK 
OUTPUT GAP 
0.81  F=1.51, 1% 
INFLATION RATE 
0.58  F=2.97, 1% 
SYMMETRIC SUPPLY SHOCK 
OUTPUT GAP 
0.83  F=1.46, 1% 
INFLATION RATE 
0.66  F=2.30, 1% 
SYMMETRIC DEMAND SHOCK 
OUTPUT GAP 
0.74  F=1.89, 1% 
INFLATION RATE 
0.16  F= 39.02, 1% 
SYMMETRIC FISCAL SHOCK 
OUTPUT GAP 
0.99  F=1.02; 10% 
INFLATION RATE 
0.29  F=11.59; 1% 
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Table 2 shows the beneficial impact of automatic stabilisers. The ratios indicate the 
relationship of the aggregate variable with and without automatic stabilisation. As indicated 
the ratios are all well below one which clearly signals the beneficial impact of automatic 
stabilisation. Additionally the results show that within the New Keynesian framework output 
stabilisation is a valuable device to keep the inflation rate on track, as it helps to smooth out 
the impact on demand shocks as well as the consequences of fiscal spending shocks itself.  
 
 
6.3  Deficiency 2: A Defective Alarming System 
In this section we will show that the SGP is a defective alarming system, that is likely to 
trigger the monitoring procedure even if fiscal policy is conducted in a sustainable fashion. To 
state the case the starting point is the following reduced form: 
  1 ttt XMXv - =+   (19) 
{ }
'
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Fiscal policy is conducted according to the notion: 
  1,11,11,
f
tttt gygg cle - =-+++   (20) 
To make realistic inferences we have calibrated  1 1.8% g =-  which is approximately 
the average from (1996 - 2005) and is also equal to the structural balance projected for 2005 
for the euro area on average by the OECD. Clearly a structural balance equal to -1.8% would 
not be in line with the strict view the Commission takes but it would well be consistent with 
the 60% (debt/GDP) ratio in the long run (see (De Grauwe 2000)). Therefore we model by 
assumption a sustainable fiscal stance. The 3%-deficit criterion can only be breached within 
our simulation if the fiscal stance parameter is driven by large demand, supply or fiscal 
spending shocks itself. In the following we want to illustrate with the help of a simulation that 
the alarm system nested in the SGP is not reliable.  
To make realistic inferences within our small scale macro model we have taken care of 
the fact that the structural supply and demand shocks hitting the individual member countries 
are correlated (see Angeloni et al. 1999). We have made a Choleski-Decomposition of the 
variance covariance matrix in order to express the reduced form shocks as a linear 
combination of the underlying structural disturbances to which the economy is subject so that 
  ' PP S=W ,  (21)   23 
where  W  is the reduced form variance covariance matrix. Based on this reduced form 
we have simulated the model over a hypothetical period of 100000 quarters
10. Figure 4 shows 
the results of the simulation. Hence the Maastricht criteria are too strict as in none of the 
identified outcomes the long run sustainability is endangered as we have modelled by 
definition a sustainable fiscal stance. Therefore as long as the violation of the 3%-deficit 
criterion stems from the size of exogenous shocks and not from a  fiscal policy that is 
conducted in an unsustainable fashion the violation of the Maastricht criteria is a necessary 
precondition to let automatic stabilisers freely operate. Of course it is equally possible that 
fiscal spending shocks itself might be responsible for “excessive deficits” (e.g. a natural 
disaster like in Germany’s flooding events 2002). But as long as these shocks are 
symmetrically distributed they are unproblematic. 
 





PROB. THAT AT 




Fitted  0.0499   0.4859  0.11 
Hughes, Hallet McAdam 
(2003) 
0.0800  0.66 
 
 
Based on these analysis we have found that the unconditional probability for an individual 
member country to be driven above the 3% deficit criterion by a large shock is approximately 
between 2.5%-5%. This in itself might seem an acceptable probability. Nevertheless the 
currency area consists of twelve member states. Let us for the sake of simplicity assume that 
the member countries are of equal size and that the unconditional probabilities are 
uncorrelated. Then we see that the probability of triggering the alarming mechanism on error 
dramatically increases well above 25% to 66% which does not seem to be sustainable from a 
political perspective.  Hence with the help of the proceeding analysis we wanted to indicate 
that the current setting implied by the 3%-deficit criterion is unreliable as a warning system to 
identify an unsustainable fiscal stance. The assumed causal relationship between high 
                                                   
10 Note that their  is quite some discussion whether the very introduction of a currency area has altered the 
correlation structure of shocks. Karman et al (2003) argue that there is evidence from bivariate VAR-analysis 
that shocks effecting the demand and supply side of the economies in Europe have converged to a degree of 
correlation of round about 0.5 for both types of shocks respectively. Within our simulation we have chosen lower 
correlations which were reported by  Angeloni et al (1999). The correlation of fiscal spending shocks was set   24 
inflation rates driven by fiscal policy and the fiscal balance is everything but exhaustive. 
Additionally one should keep in mind that historically a direct relationship between the fiscal 
balance and the inflation rate was only given if fiscal policy could borrow directly from the 
central bank. But this is explicitly ruled out by Art. 102 as the ECB is prohibited to borrow 
funds to fiscal authorities. 
Therefore we strongly propose to reform the three percent deficit criterion. In particular 
we think that  triggering of the monitoring procedure  should be conditioned on additional 
macroeconomic data. In particular we would like to propose to test whether the actual 
inflation rate is above 3%. The logic is quite simple. Only if the inflation rate and the deficit 
criterion are violated fiscal policy might undermine the credibility of the central bank in the 
medium to long run. In other scenarios high deficits are likely to simply mirrow weak 
economic growth. Under such settings fiscal spending cuts are procyclical. Conditioning the 
monitoring procedure on the criterion whether the inflation rate was in the target range of the 
ECB dramatically reduces the risk of triggering the 3% deficit criterion on error. 
 
 
8  Some Propositions 
 
In the previous sections we have outlined that the current institutional setting impairs the 
ability of the euro area members to use fiscal policy as an effective stabilisation tool. What 
one effectively needs to understand is that limiting the functioning of fiscal policy effectively 
adds more fluctuations on other parts of the economy (e.g., the output gap). Quite clearly 
today’s rules in reign were shaped by the views on the functioning of the economy we as 
economists had at the outset of the 1990’s. This view was still heavily shaped by myopic 
politicians that aimed at cheating the public. In that respect (Paul De Grauwe (Financial 
Times, 25 July 2002)) stated: 
“The stability pact is a vote of no confidence by the European authorities in the strength of 
the democratic institutions in the member countries. It is quite surprising that EU-countries 
have allowed this to happen, and that they have agreed to be subjected to control by 
European institutions that even the International Monetary Fund does not impose on banana 
republics.” 
                                                                                                                                                               
equal to null. Bruneau et al (1999) report modest negative correlations of -0.11 prior to the introduction of the 
monetary union.   25 
Generally the relationship between the cyclical stance of fiscal policy and the level of 
indebtness is not yet well understood. In particular the question which needs to be addressed 
is to which extend can the CAB be negative on average but still consistent with a long run 
sustainable debt/GDP ratio. Today’s answer seems to be zero which is clearly at odds with for 
instance the golden rule that states that long term public investments that generates yields 
over many periods to come should be financed by debt. Nevertheless there seems to be some 
evidence that a high level of existing debt seems to induce a procyclical movements in the 
fiscal stance during downturns (OECD 2002). 
Since fiscal policy rules are essential for the functioning of a monetary union, the 
analysis of this paper calls for a reform of the SGP. While the current framework with its 
focus on inflation is clearly too one-dimensional, it could be relatively easy supplemented 
with an additional dimension which takes care of the mix between the common monetary 
policy and national fiscal policies. Again, this paper can only give some general suggestions. 
Since the ECB has a very strong interest in preventing excessive inflation at the national level, 
it would be useful to base the assessment of fiscal policy on forecasts for the national rate and 
their compatibility with the ECB’s inflation target.  
As long as the majority of forecasts shows that a country’s inflation rate will remain 
within the ECB’s target range of “below 2%”, there would be presumption that the overall 
policy mix of national fiscal policy and the national real interest rate is adequate. In this 
situation, a fiscal deficit exceeding the 3% threshold would not pose a problem for the 
common monetary policy. Of course, it would be necessary to make an additional assessment 
whether this fiscal policy stance could threaten the overall solidity of a country’s public 
finances. E.g., in the present situation of Germany such a risk could be clearly excluded. 
•  If the majority of forecasts shows an infla tion rate that exceeds the ECB’s target range 
by a certain margin (e.g. one percentage point), there is a presumption that policy mix 
is inadequate. If in this situation the deficit exceeds 3 %, there is a strong indication 
that the national fiscal policy  is not compatible with an adequate policy mix and an 
excessive deficit procedure would be warranted. 
•  If the forecasts show that the national rate will exceed the ECB’s inflation target by a 
wider margin (e.g. two percentage points), one can think of imposing sanctions for 
fiscal policy even if the deficit is below three percent or even if it is in a much better 
position. The main advantage of this inflation targeting framework, which would of 
course need much discussion in detail, is that it provides the flexibility that national 
fiscal policy needs in a monetary union in order to cope with idiosyncratic shocks. At   26 
the same time, it would set more stringent fiscal limits for high inflation countries than 
envisaged in SGP. 
In sum, the main flaw of the SGP is its neglect of the interplay of national fiscal policy 
and national monetary conditions in a monetary union. Although, as the example of Portugal 
shows, an “excessive deficit” can be caused by fiscal laxness, it can also be due to a self-
aggravating process of below average growth, subdued nominal wage increases, below 
average inflation and an above average real interest rate. Thus, the SGP’s one dimensional 
focus on the deficit-inflation nexus can be totally misleading. A strict application of the SGP 
can  have the consequence that a country is forced to abandon its only macroeconomic 
stabiliser and even to pursue a procyclical fiscal policy. The current attempt of a government 
to reduce the structural deficit in a period of economic stagnation and increasing 
unemployment is a case in point. Together with above average real interest rates such a policy 
mix entails a high risk of deflation and of a further widening of monetary conditions within 
EMU. As monetary policy would become very difficult under such conditions, the ECB 
should also have a strong interest in avoiding such risks. Since fiscal policy rules are 
necessary in a monetary union, the SGP should be supplemented in a way that it sanctions 
fiscal policies only if a country’s overall macroeconomic policy stance is inflationary, i.e. if 
forecasts show that its inflation rate will exceed the ECB’s target rate by one or more 
percentage points. Such an “inflation targeting” approach would not only provide a better 
policy mix in countries with weak growth, since the 3 % threshold would not be binding. It 
would also improve the policy mix in above inflation countries since one could think of 
sanctions whenever the fiscal policy stance contributes to inflation beyond the ECB’s target 
range. 




A.1  The General Model Setup 
Closely following (Söderlind 1999)  we can rewrite our basic equation in state space form as 
follows. In a first step we insert the fiscal spending equation and the real exchange rate ino the 
IS-relationship. Then we lead our model one period ahead and solve for the rational 
expectations variables  4t2  and E ttt Ey p ++  with the highest time index. Then for country i the 
Phillips curve and the IS equation c an be stated as follows: 
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Where  1t X  is a 171 ·  vector of predetermined state variables  2t X is a  81 ·  vector of forward 
looking variables and  1t n  is a vector of shocks. Following Söderlind et al. (2002) we have 























































































Note that due to the specific structure of the matrix A0 it holds that 
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A.2  Defining the Measurement Equation 
Let us define a vector Yt as target variables in which the ECB is interested. We assume that 
the common central bank is only interested in aggregate variables: 
[ ] 12311231212 ttttttttttttttttttt Yyyiiiiiiiy pppppppp ----------- =DDDDDDD  
We can define the target variables as a function of the state variables and the interest rate. 
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A.3  The Proposed Calibration Scheme 
We calibrate simultaneously the vector  1,,,, y p ylnmm Øø = ºß  with: 
•  p m  the degree of forward lookingness in the Phillips curve. 
•  y m  the degree of forward lookingness in the IS-curve. 
•  l  weight monetary policy puts on output stabilisation relative to stabilising the inflation 
rate. 
•  u weight the central bank puts on interest rate smoothing relative to inflation rate 
stabilisation. 
To minimise the following distance criterion: 
  ( )
' MinW
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Criterion 5: [ ]
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We have proposed an equal weightening of all constructed six criteria. 
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A.5   Impulse Response Functions 
Symmetric Supply Shock Hitting the Currency Area  
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* The dotted line plots the impulse response function of the fitted combination. The squared line plotts the impulse response function 
attatched to ( l =0;  2 n = ). All other evaluated combinations lie in between. 
 
Symmetric Demand Shock Hitting the Currency Area 
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* The dotted line plots the impulse response function of the fitted combination. The squared line plotts the impulse response function 
attatched to ( l =0;  2 n = ). All other evaluated combinations lie in between. 
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Asymmetric Supply Shock Hitting the Currency Area*  
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The dotted line plots the impulse response function of the fitted combination. The squared line plotts the impulse response function attatched 
to (l =0;  2 n = ). All other evaluated combinations lie in between. 
 
Asymmetric Supply Shock: Dispersion Indicators 









Inflation Dispersion in the Currency Area
Quaters  









Output dispersion in the Currency Area
Quaters  






Dispersion in Real Interest Rates in the Currency Area
Quaters  









Dispersion in Real Exchange Rates
Quaters  
The dotted line plots the impulse response function of the fitted combination. The squared line plotts the impulse response function attatched 
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Assymmetric Demand Shock Hitting the Currency Area 
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* The dotted line plots the impulse response function of the fitted combination. The squared line plotts the impulse response function 
attatched to ( l =0;  2 n = ). All other evaluated combinations lie in between.. 
 
Asymmetric Demand Shock: Dispersion Indicators  
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The dotted line plots the impulse response function of the fitted combination. The squared line plotts the impulse response function attatched 
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Interest Rate Shock Hitting the Currency Area 
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Country One: Fiscal Deficit
Quaters
Fiscal Deficit: l -o-
 






Country Two: Fiscal Deficit
Quaters
Fiscal Deficit: l -o-
 
 
* The dotted line plots the impulse response function of the fitted combination. The squared line plotts the impulse response function 
attatched to ( l =0;  2 n = ). All other evaluated combinations lie in between. 
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Baseline Calibration 
 
BASELINE CALIBRATION: ANNUAL VALUES  
Parameters  Values 
PHILLIPS CURVE   
1 p a   0.330618 
2 p a   0.067335 
3 p a   0.314959 
4 p a   0.409031 
y a   0.210195 
x   0.1 
p v   0.5 
IS-Equation   
1 y b   1.032538 
2 y b   -0.215810 
r b   -0.160634 
r   0.5 
d   0.25 
i  -0.3 
y v   0.2 
Monetary Policy   
l   3.95 
J  5.95 
Fiscal Policy rule   
c   -0.3 
q   0 
1 g   1.8 
Demand Externalities  0.5 r =  
Elasticity of change in 
the  exchange rate 
0.25 d =  
Imported inflation  0.1 x =  
    Values were taken from: {Van Arle, Garretsen Harry, et al. 2003 249 /id}   38 
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